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This study was conducted to examine interpersonal predictive coding in
individuals with high-functioning autism (HFA). Healthy and HFA partici-
pants observed point-light displays of two agents (A and B) performing
separate actions. In the ‘communicative’ condition, the action performed by
agent B responded to a communicative gesture performed by agent A.
In the ‘individual’ condition, agent A’s communicative action was substituted
by a non-communicative action. Using a simultaneous masking-detection
task, we demonstrate that observing agent A’s communicative gesture
enhanced visual discrimination of agent B for healthy controls, but not for par-
ticipants with HFA. These results were not explained by differences in
attentional factors as measured via eye-tracking, or by differences in the recog-
nition of the point-light actions employed. Our findings, therefore, suggest that
individuals with HFA are impaired in the use of social information to predict
others’ actions and provide behavioural evidence that such deficits could be
closely related to impairments of predictive coding.1. Introduction
Action perception is not simply a reflection of what happens, but a projection
of what will happen next. When we observe an action performed by another
individual, our visual system anticipates how the action will unfold. Remark-
ably, body motion can represent a rich and reliable source of information [1].
Observers are capable of predicting the outcome of an observed action
when viewing body movements even in the absence of contextual information.
For instance, by looking at a point-light display of a person throwing a stone,
observers can correctly judge the location targeted by the throw [2]. In more
complex situations, movement observation can enable the observer to predict
the other person’s intentions. For example, from seeing a point-light display
of someone grasping an object, observers can anticipate whether the object is
grasped with the intent to cooperate, compete, or perform an individual
action [3,4].
Recent evidence suggests that action perception based on body motion is
crucial not only for interpreting the actions of individual agents, but also to pre-
dict how, in the context of an interaction between two agents, the actions of one
agent relate to the actions of a second agent. In a seminal study, Neri et al. [5]
demonstrated that when observing interactive activity requiring close body
contact between two agents (such as fighting and dancing), the human visual
system relies on the spatio-temporal coupling between two agents to retrieve
information relating to each agent individually. Interestingly, the same holds
Table 1. Demographic and neuropsychological variables of control and patient group. IQ was assessed by a German multiple-choice vocabulary test
(Wortschatztest, WST) [27], which allows for a quick and valid estimation of general intelligence [28,29]. s.d., standard deviation.
HFA n516 HC n516 t-test
sex ratio (female : male) 4 : 12 6 : 10 t30 ¼ 0.75, p ¼ 0.46
mean age (s.d.) 41.56 (9.15) 36.19 (12.11) t28 ¼ 1.42, p ¼ 0.17
mean years in education (s.d.) 18.63 (4.91) 18.94 (2.72) t23 ¼ 20.22, p ¼ 0.83
mean IQ (s.d.) 116.88 (15.59) 115.31 (8.43) t23 ¼ 0.35, p ¼ 0.73
mean BDI (s.d.) 16.44 (11.45) 3.88 (4.56) t30 ¼ 4.08, p, 0.01
mean AQ (s.d.) 40.50 (5.83) 14.19 (6.91) t30 ¼ 11.64, p, 0.01
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
371:20150373
2
 on April 19, 2016http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from true for social interactions that do not imply close body contact:
observing the communicative gesture of one agent enhances
the visual discrimination of a second agent responding to
this communicative gesture, a phenomenon that has been
referred to as ‘interpersonal predictive coding’ [4,6,7].
This study was designed to investigate interpersonal pre-
dictive coding in individuals with high-functioning autism
(HFA). Individuals with autism show a reduced ability in
reporting subjective and emotional states from point-light ani-
mations [8,9]. Whether they are also poor at understanding the
actions of others from biological motion cues, however, is
controversial. While some studies report impaired action rec-
ognition [10], other studies suggest that HFA observers do
not differ from typical observers [9,11]. Similarly, while some
studies report a lower sensitivity in detecting biological
motion in individuals with HFA [12,13], others find no differ-
ence from control individuals’ performance [14–16]. Cusack
et al. [17] recently employed point-light stimuli of two interact-
ing agents (fighting or dancing) to analyse the performance of
individuals with HFA in a set of well-controlled tasks, span-
ning from low-level biological motion detection to action
recognition and the ability to distinguish synchronized
versus non-synchronized action sequences. They found no evi-
dence of impairment in any of the tasks, thus, suggesting that
persons with HFA are able to discriminate intact versus
scrambled biological motion sequences, to discriminate one
form of interaction from another, and even to discriminate
between two agents who are acting in a synchronous way
from those who are not.
However, clinical insight and marked impairments of
social functioning in everyday life suggest that individuals
with HFA fail to exploit such biological motion signals for
the purposes of typical social interactions. Possibly because
of this, some studies have suggested that individuals with
autism spend less time attending to social cues compared
with healthy controls (HCs) [18], and that autistic symptom
severity may be related to reduced fixations of stimuli [19].
In this study, we used quantitative psychophysical
measurements to investigate the modulatory effects of bio-
logical motion signals on perceiving a second agent while
controlling for the role of low-level attentional factors through
simultaneous eye-tracking. Our results show that despite being
able to discriminate correctly between communicative and
individual non-communicative action sequences when expli-
citly prompted to do so in a separate task, participants with
HFA are not automatically using the action of one agent as a
predictor of the action of an interacting partner who does not
stand in physical contact with the first.2. Material and methods
(a) Participants
In order to determine the sample size of our study to detect an
interaction between group (HFA versus HC) and condition (com-
municative (COM) versus individual (IND)) in the interpersonal
detection task (d0), we performed a power analysis. Assuming a
medium effect size (partial eta-squared ¼ 0.06), and a correlation
between repeated measures ¼ 0.80 (obtained in a pilot study),
we set power at 0.95 to avoid a possible type II error. Correlation
between repeated measures for the interpersonal detection task
was estimated in a pretest run of 14 healthy participants (nine
females and five males; age: M ¼ 27.4, s.d. ¼ 1.9; education:
M ¼ 17.1, s.d. ¼ 0.9). Repeated-measures ANOVA on d0 with
condition (COM versus IND) as a within-subject factor revealed
a significant main effect of condition (F1,13 ¼ 6.61, p ¼ 0.023,
partial h2 ¼ 0.34), with participants showing a higher discrimi-
nation performance in the COM condition (M ¼ 1.55, s.d. ¼
0.83) compared with the IND condition (M ¼ 1.21, s.d. ¼ 0.67).
A significant correlation between d0 in the COM and IND con-
dition was found (r13 ¼ 0.80, p ¼ 0.001). The power analysis
conducted in G*Power [20,21] determined that a total sample
of 32 participants was needed to obtain power ¼ 0.95, a ¼ 0.05,
two-tailed. Consequently, 16 adults with HFA and 16 HCs
were recruited for this study. The two groups were closely
matched for age, sex, years of education, and IQ as measured
by WST (Wortschatztest, German multiple-choice vocabulary
test, [18]). The group of HC reported no history of neurological
or psychiatric disorders and no current use of psychoactive
medications. Furthermore, they were only included if they had
an autism spectrum quotient (AQ) below 23 [22] and a Beck
depression inventory (BDI) score of 17 or below [23]. All HFA
participants were diagnosed and recruited in the Autism Outpa-
tient Clinic at the Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy,
University Hospital of Cologne in Germany. Clinical consensus
diagnosis was established using the international classification
of diseases (ICD-10) criteria by two clinicians specialized in
autism diagnosis in adulthood, who explored each individual
patient in an independent interview and examination. All diag-
noses were confirmed by one of two senior psychiatrists
specialized in autism. Patients with a diagnosis of childhood
autism (F84.0) and Asperger syndrome (F84.5) were included
when average or above-average IQ had been ascertained. As
depression is a common co-morbidity in HFA [24,25], autistic
participants with a BDI score above 17 or a history of depression
were not excluded from the study although this resulted in a
significant difference in the BDI scores between HFA and HC.
To control for depression symptoms, correlations with BDI
scores were included during data analysis (for details, see the
Data Analysis section). In accordance with the clinical diagnosis,
there were significant differences in the autism spectrum
quotient [26] between HFA and HC (table 1).
agent
A
agent
B
Figure 1. Example of a communicative signal trial. Agent A points to an object to be picked up; agent B bends down and picks it up. Agent B was presented using
limited-lifetime technique (six signal dots) and masked with temporally scrambled noise dots. The noise level displayed is the minimum allowed in the experiment (five
noise dots). To provide a static depiction of the animated sequence, dots extracted from three different frames are superimposed and simultaneously represented; the
silhouette depicting the human form was not visible in the stimulus display. (Adapted from [6]).
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(i) Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of two point-light walkers, each made up of
13 markers indicating the major joints of the actor. These stimuli
were selected from the communicative interaction database—
5AFC format (CID, [30,31]). Six point-light stimuli were employed,
three belonging to the COM condition (‘squat down’, ‘look at the
ceiling’, and ‘sit down’) and three belonging to the IND condition
(‘turn over’, ‘sneeze’, and ‘drink’). COM stimuli showed a commu-
nicative interaction between two agents, with an agent (A)
performing a communicative gesture towards a second agent (B),
who respondedaccordingly (figure 1). Stimuli for the INDcondition
were created by substituting agent A’s communicative actionwith a
non-communicative action with the same onset and duration.(ii) Apparatus
Eyemovementswere recorded using a Tobii T60 eye-trackerwith a
sampling frequency of 60 Hz. Stimuli were presented on the inte-
grated 17-inch TFT monitor with resolution set to 1280 1024
pixels. A five-point eye calibration was run before the beginning
of each of two blocks in the main experiment. Participants were
tested individually in a dimly lit and sound-attenuated room. Par-
ticipants were seated at a viewing distance of 60 cm from the
screen, and were asked to sit as still as possible. However, they
were not restrained in their head and trunk movements.(iii) Training session
Before the detection task, the number of noise dots was adjusted
individually for each participant during a training session. Stimuli
consisted of three actions selected from the CID, masked with five
levels of noise (zero, five, 10, 20, or 40 noise dots). The actions were
different from those used in themain experiment. Each participant
completed two blocks of 60 trials each (four repetitions of three
actions by five noise levels). After completing the second block,
individual noise levels were determined by fitting a cumulative
Gaussian function to the proportion of correct responses anddetermining the 70% threshold. The minimum noise level allowed
was five noise dots.(iv) Experimental procedure
Interpersonal detection task. A two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC)
paradigm was employed: each trial consisted of two intervals, a
‘target’ interval (containing agent B) and a ‘non-target’ interval
(not containing agent B), separated by the presentation of a
500 ms fixation cross. Depending on the action stimulus, the
duration of each interval ranged from 3600 to 4333 ms (M ¼
3978 ms, s.d. ¼ 0.367 ms). In the target interval, B’s actions were
displayed using a limited-lifetime technique and masked with
limited-lifetime noise dots [5,32]. This technique was used to pre-
vent observers from using local motion or position cues to
perform the task [33]. Each signal dot was presented for 200 ms
at one of the 13 possible locations, then disappeared and reap-
peared at another randomly chosen location. Only six signal dots
per framewere shown simultaneously. Dot appearance and disap-
pearance were asynchronous across frames. Noise dots had the
same trajectories, size, and duration as the signal dots, but were
temporally and spatially scrambled. The number of noise dots
was adjusted individually for each participant during a pretest
session (for further details, see ‘Training session’).
In the non-target interval, agent B was substituted by a
scrambled version of the corresponding signal action obtained
by temporally scrambling the relevant dots. Noise dots were
also added in order to obtain the same number of dots as dis-
played in the signal interval. On average, positions and
motions of the dots in the non-target interval equalled those of
the target interval [5]. In both the target and the non-target inter-
vals, agent A was neither masked nor limited-lifetime (figure 2).
After seeing the two intervals during each trial, partici-
pants were asked to decide which interval contained agent
B. Responses were given by pressing one of two marked keys on
a keyboard (maximum response time ¼ 2 s). In line with previous
results, we hypothesized that the ability to detect agent Bwould be
enhanced in the communicative condition. This is because this con-
dition includes complementary actions, which means that the
interval 1
fixation cross
interval 2
forced choice
1 2?
time
Figure 2. Schematic of trial structure. After seeing the stimuli during two
intervals (interval 1 and 2)—separated by the presentation of a fixation
cross (500 ms)—participants were asked to decide which interval contained
agent B. The maximum response time was 2000 ms.
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participant completed two blocks of 96 trials each (16 repetitions of
three actions in two conditions). Both blocks comprised trials of
both conditions presented in a randomized order. Blocks lasted
approximately 15 min each and were separated by a rest period
of 3 min. After completion of each block, participants were
informed about their current percentage of correct responses.
Recognition task. After completion of the detection task, partici-
pants were administered an explicit intention recognition task.
Stimuli consisted of 21 videos of point-light actions depicting two
point-light agents (neither limited-lifetime nor masked) selected
from the communicative-interaction database—5AFC format (31),
including 14 communicative actions (COM: ‘come closer’, ‘squat
down’, ‘walk away’, ‘imitate me’, ‘look at the ceiling’, ‘look at the
floor’, ‘go out of the way’, ‘no’, ‘pick this up’, ‘move this down’,
‘sit down’, ‘stand up’, ‘stop’, and ‘choose which one’) and seven
individual actions (IND: ‘turn over’, ‘jump’, ‘sneeze’, ‘lateral
steps’, ‘drink’, ‘stretch’, and ‘look under the foot’). The six actions
(three COM, three IND) used in the detection task were included
in the list. Stimuli were presented in a randomized order. Every
video was presented twice consecutively. After the second rep-
etition of each video, participants were asked three questions:
(i) to report whether the action had been presented in the inter-
personal detection task; (ii) to decide whether the two agents
were communicating versus acting independently of each other;
and (iii) to select the correct action description among five response
alternatives, presented in German [31]. The five alternatives were
assembled by replacing the correct description of agent A’s action
(e.g. A asks B to walk away) with two incorrect communicative
alternatives (e.g. A opens the door for B; A asks B to move some-
thing) and two incorrect non-communicative alternatives
(A stretches; A draws a line). Questions were presented on the
screen until response, with no time restriction. No feedback
concerning response correctness was given to the participants.
(v) Data analysis
The behavioural measurements obtained during the experiment
were recorded and later analysed by using MATLAB scripts
(MathWorks, Natick, MA) and Predictive Analytics software
v. 18 (PASW18; www.spss.com).
Interpersonal detection task. For each participant, we calculated
the proportion of hits (defined as ‘second interval’ responses
when the target was in the second interval) and false alarms
(second interval responseswhen the targetwas in the first interval)
in the two experimental conditions to estimate the signal detection
theory (SDT) parameters sensitivity (d0) and criterion (c) in the twoexperimental conditions [34]. Sensitivity is a measure of the indi-
vidual’s ability to discriminate whether the signal (here, agent B)
is presented in the first or in the second interval. Higher values
of d0 (ranging from 0 to þ10) indicate better discrimination ability.
The response criterion c, also known as ‘response bias’, reflects the
tendency to report that the signal (here, agent B) is presented in the
first or the second interval. In 2AFC tasks, the criterion does not
usually differ from zero, which indicates no systematic tendency
to respond ‘first interval’ or ‘second interval’. Proportions of 0
were replaced with 0.5/N, and proportions of 1 were replaced
with (N2 0.5)/N (where N is the number of first interval and
second interval trials).
Paired sample t-tests were used to investigate condition-
specific differences in sensitivity and criterion for each group
separately. To evaluate condition- and group-specific differences
in sensitivity and criterion as well as their statistical interaction,
we used a mixed repeated-measure ANOVA employing the
within-subject factor ‘condition’ (COM versus IND) and a
between-subject independent variable ‘group’ (HFA versus HC).
In order to rule out a possible influence of BDI scores on task
performance, the BDI scores were used for correlation analyses
with sensitivity measurements from all experimental conditions.
Furthermore, AQ scores were used for correlation analyses with
sensitivity measurements to estimate the relationship between
the degree of ‘autistic traits’ and task performance.
Python software (Python Software Foundation, v. 2.7.3150)
was used to extract and post-process gaze position and pupil
size data over time, as measures of visual attention and arousal,
respectively. Owing to technical problems and excessive head
movements, data from 12 HFA participants and 13 HC partici-
pants could be included in the gaze data analysis. To ensure
that all participants were engaged in the task and attended
both presented agents (A and B), we extracted the number and
position data of gaze events in two regions of interest (ROI): a
right ROI where agent A was located and a left ROI where
agent B was located. The ROIs were defined by fitting the smal-
lest possible rectangle onto the visual display that comprised all
stimulus dots on each side of the stimulus screen. In order to
explore potential differences in eye movements between groups
and conditions, the number of fixations as well as the number
of gaze shifts between right ROI and left ROI was calculated.
To detect fixations, a dispersion-threshold algorithm was used
[35], with a dispersion threshold of 43 pixels and a minimal fix-
ation duration of 100 ms. Gaze shifts were defined as two
sequential fixations falling onto different ROIs. Measures of
pupil size were directly provided by the Tobii T60 system and
also recorded during the entire duration of the main test.
Recognition task. In order to assess whether participants were
able to recognize COM and IND actions when these were not
masked by noise dots—including those six actions which had
been part of the detection task—we computed the percentage
of correct responses for each of the three questions, and we
compared the mean performance across the two groups by
means of independent sample t-tests.3. Results
(a) Interpersonal detection task
The mean proportion of correct responses in the main exper-
iment was 0.64 (s.d. ¼ 10.74) in the HC group and 0.69 in
the HFA group (s.d. ¼ 9.86). This indicates that the number
of noise dots selected in the training session was sufficiently
accurate for the participants of both groups. No significant
difference between the mean number of noise dots was
found between the HFA group (M ¼ 10.56, s.d.¼ 9.32) and
the HC group (M ¼ 14.63, s.d. ¼ 9.32) (t30 ¼ 21.23; p ¼ 0.23,
1.20
1.00
0.80
0.60
group
0.40
0.20
0
HFA
HC
d¢
*
COM condition IND condition
Figure 3. Mean sensitivity (d0) across groups and conditions. Error bars
depict 95% confidence intervals.
50
40
30
20
10
0
HFA
HC
d¢ COM
AQ
group
0 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00
Figure 4. Correlation between AQ and d0 in the COM condition across groups.
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(c) parameter was found between the HFA group (M ¼ 0.028;
s.d. ¼ 0.26) and the HC group (M ¼ 20.13; s.d. ¼ 0.28) (t30 ¼
1.61; p ¼ 0.12, partial h2¼ 0.08).
Repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect of condition (F1,30 ¼ 4.93, p ¼ 0.034, partial h2¼ 0.14),
with higher sensitivity in the COM (M ¼ 0.72, s.d. ¼ 0.53)
than in the IND condition (M ¼ 0.61, s.d. ¼ 0.48). However,
this was moderated by a significant interaction effect between
condition and group (F1,30 ¼ 7.45, p ¼ 0.011, partial h2¼
0.20). To break down this interaction, a simple effects analysis
was performed, which demonstrated a significant effect of
condition in the HC group (F1,15 ¼ 12.25, p ¼ 0.001, partial
h2 ¼ 0.29), whereas no such effect was observed in the
HFA group (F1,15 ¼ 0.13, p ¼ 0.721, partial h2 ¼ 0.004;
figure 3). In the light of a smaller number of participants
for whom eye-tracking data were available, we repeated
our repeated-measures ANOVA in this sample (12 patients,
13 controls) and also found the significant interaction effect
between condition and group (F1,23 ¼ 5.14, p ¼ 0.033, partial
h2 ¼ 0.183).
To further corroborate the hypothesis of an interaction
between group and condition, we conducted a Bayes factors
analysis [36,37]: applying the JZS Bayes factor method
suggested by Rouder and co-workers [36] to our sensitivity
data (with default scale factor 1.0) yields a Bayes factor of
4.7, meaning that the hypothesis of an interaction between
group and condition is almost five times more probable
than the null hypothesis of an absence of interaction. As a
factor in excess of 3.2 is conventionally considered to provide
‘substantial’ evidence in favour of a hypothesis [37], the Baye-
sian factor analysis suggests that the present results are
unlikely to be due to a type II error.
Correlation analyses of BDI scores with measures of sen-
sitivity across all experimental conditions and groups did not
show any significant results (maximum r ¼ 20.25, minimum
p ¼ 0.17). Correlation analyses of AQ with measures ofsensitivity across both groups did show a significant negative
correlation between AQ and d0 in the COM condition
(r ¼ 20.422, p ¼ 0.016; figure 4).
Eye-tracking data showed that both HC and HFA visually
inspected both agents. Consistently, we found no significant
between-group difference for either total number of fixations
(HFA: M ¼ 1250.83, s.d.¼ 503.33; HC: M ¼ 898.92, s.d.¼
454.59, t23 ¼ 1.84, p ¼ 0.79) or gaze shifts from one ROI to the
other (HFA: M ¼ 449.17, s.d. ¼ 354.22; HC: M ¼ 317.31,
s.d. ¼ 136.73, t23 ¼ 1.25, p ¼ 0.23). No between-group differ-
ence was observed for pupil size across all experimental
conditions (HFA: M ¼ 2.98, s.d. ¼ 0.28; HC: M ¼ 3.14, s.d. ¼
0.52, t17 ¼ 20.97, p ¼ 0.34). In order to compare the number
of fixations across the two ROIs for both groups, we performed
a mixed repeated-measures ANOVA, which demonstrated
a significant main effect of ROI (F1,23 ¼ 20.75, p, 0.001)
with more fixations in the left ROI containing agent B (M ¼
789.32, s.d. ¼ 425.99) than in the right ROI containing agent
A (M ¼ 278.52, s.d. ¼ 307.62). There was no significant inter-
action effect between fixations in each ROI and group
(F1,23 ¼ 3.38, p ¼ 0.079). No significant difference between the
COM and the IND condition was found in pupil size or in
gaze behaviour across groups.
(b) Recognition task
Question (1): no significant difference was found between
HFA and HC participants in the ability to correctly identify
which COM and IND actions had been presented in the pre-
vious detection task (mean proportion of correct responses
in HFA: M ¼ 0.62, s.d. ¼ 0.36; HC: M ¼ 0.80, s.d. ¼ 0.20,
t30 ¼ 21.82; p ¼ 0.08).
Question (2): no difference between groups was found in
the ability to classify the stimuli employed in the detection
task (n ¼ 6) as communicative versus non-communicative
(HFA: M ¼ 0.88, s.d. ¼ 0.13, HC: M ¼ 0.87, s.d. ¼ 0.13, t30 ¼
0.23, p ¼ 0.82). The same was true for the actions not pre-
sented in the detection task (n ¼ 15) (HFA: 0.89, s.d. ¼ 0.07,
HC: 0.91, s.d. ¼ 0.08), t30 ¼ 20.67, p ¼ 0.51).
Question (3): no difference between HFA group and
HC group was found in selecting which of the five
100
80
60
40
20
0
HC
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3
m
ea
n
 %
 o
f c
or
re
ct
 re
sp
on
se
s
group
HFA
Figure 5. Bar graphs of correct responses during post-test questionnaire
across groups. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. Question 1: ‘Did
you see this action in the previous task?’ Question 2: ‘Are the two agents
communicating or acting independently from one another?’ Question 3:
‘Which alternative best describes this action?’.
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(HFA: M ¼ 0.73, s.d. ¼ 0.11, HC: M ¼ 0.79, s.d. ¼ 0.11,
t30 ¼ 21.70, p ¼ 0.10; figure 5).4. Discussion
Previous studies have shown that in the context of interactive
activities between two agents, the actions of one agent can be
used as predictors of the actions of a second agent, which has
been referred to as ‘interpersonal predictive coding’ (4). Corro-
borating these previous findings, healthy participants in the
study described here made use of the communicative actions
of a first agent (A) to predict the actions of a second agent
(B). Critically, this form of interpersonal predictive coding
was not found in a matched group of individuals with HFA.
Autistic participants did not show any improvement in the
communicative condition compared with the individual con-
dition, in which A and B acted independently of each other.
This finding stands in contrast to recent evidence suggesting
that the HFA ‘perceptual system returns functionally intact
signals for interpreting other people’s actions adequately’ [17].
Importantly, our study allows a number of potentially con-
founding factors to be ruled out: first, because participants
with autism in our study looked at agent A and B for the
same amount of time as HCs in both the communicative and
the individual condition, we can rule out the possibility
that the difference in sensitivity across groups is due to differ-
ences in gaze behaviour. Second, performance on a second
recognition task in our study excludes the possibility that
lower performance in the detection task is explained by a
general failure to recognize communicative intentions por-
trayed by point-light displays. When presented with the
same stimuli employed in the detection task and asked tolabel them, autistic participants performed as well as HCs in
distinguishing communicative and individual actions, and in
selecting the correct action description. Third, correlational
analyses of depressive symptoms as measured by the BDI
and detection performance allows us to rule out an influence
of co-morbid psychopathology on interaction perception.
The impairment of interpersonal predictive coding in indi-
viduals with autism was most likely owing to an inability
to predict agent B’s response based on agent A’s communica-
tive intention, whereas the ability to explicitly recognize agent
A’s communicative intentions was found to be intact. These
findings are also consistent with recent evidence from compu-
tational modelling, which demonstrates that autistic traits in
HCs are not related to a general inability to process social
stimuli; rather, they are closely related to an inability to take
advantage of social information during decision-making [38].
In linewith these findings that span the entire spectrumof autis-
tic traits, our study further demonstrates that the degree of
autistic traits as measured by the AQ score [22] was negatively
correlated with detection performance across both groups, such
that participants with higher autistic traits showed decreased
interpersonal predictive coding.
(a) Interpersonal predictive coding and online social
cognition
The finding that HFA participants show an impairment of
interpersonal predictive coding has important implications
for the understanding of online social cognition in autism
[39,40]. When we are engaged in a direct social interaction
with a partner, prediction of the other person’s actions
helps us adjust our movements ‘online’, i.e. in real-time, in
order to plan an appropriate response and coordinate with
her while observing her movements [41]. Such an inability
to automatically integrate social information and use it to pre-
dict subsequent actions of conspecifics has been related to a
potential deficit of predictive coding in autism [42]. This
could be due to prior expectations that are built up through
participation in social interactions and which help us to be
responsive to others [40]. Accordingly, autistic observers
might be unable to automatically situate a person in the
context of forthcoming states and subsequent responses of a
social interactor or respondent. This deficit of interpersonal
action prediction and a resulting lack of social responsiveness
may help to explain the discrepancy between intact social
reasoning and recognition skills, and deficits in online
social interaction in HFA [43]. On the other hand, and in
the light of evidence demonstrating that expertise plays an
important role in making accurate predictions when observing
human actions [44], one could argue that extensive practice in
social interaction may lead to more accurate predictions when
observing communicative interaction dyads.
(b) Interpersonal predictive coding in the brain
A growing body of experimental and theoretical work pro-
vides evidence that predictive coding is a neurobiologically
plausible scheme [45], according to which different neural
systems generate statistical predictions about the current state
of our environment and then adjust them to the evidence ‘at
hand’. In other words, ‘expectations have a strong and general
influence on our experience of the sensory input’ [46]. Interest-
ingly, under certain conditions prior expectations may be
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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this, it has been demonstrated that prior expectations can
have an effect on the processing of others’ perceived actions
that may be so strong as to generate the illusion of seeing an
agent when no such agent is actually present, which has
been referred to as seeing a ‘Bayesian ghost’ [6].
A Bayesian account of the so-called mirror neuron system
of the brain suggests that an internal model is generated
during action observation, which transmits an action predic-
tion to representations in the superior temporal sulcus (STS)
and parietal brain areas [48]. In the same line, a recent
study provides evidence that within a predictable context,
mirror neurons can discharge before the onset of an observed
action [49]. Furthermore, recent research provides evidence
that medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) plays a key role in the
top-down control of social signal processing (i.e. social top-
down response modulation STORM [50,51]). Consistently, it
was demonstrated that mPFC activity modulates brain
activity in other regions, which are relevant for action control
in a social context, such as inferior frontal gyrus [50,52]. Simi-
larly, mPFC might also be involved in modulating brain
activity relevant for the sensory processing of social stimuli
in the STS. This modulation might convert an adaption of
priors relevant for Bayesian inference, and could help explain
the emergence of social perception in the absence of social
stimuli. In the light of evidence demonstrating that the
mPFC shows reduced activations in subjects with autismwhen they are processing social stimuli such as ‘social gaze’
[53] or evaluating the animacy of moving objects [52], the def-
icits in interpersonal predictive coding in autism described
heremight be due to an underlying abnormality inmPFC. Fur-
thermore, it is conceivable that differences in long-range
connectivity in autism may prevent mPFC-based modulations
of temporoparietal regions relevant for the processing of bio-
logical motion. Future brain imaging studies could help to
provide new insights into these modulatory processes by
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